| What Affected the Steel Strikes of 1892 and 1919? |
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| Business > Industrial |
| Written by Michael Alan Reuben |
| Sunday, 01 February 2009 00:12 |
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The confrontation with Pinkerton's during the 1892 strike at Homestead provided the turning point that decided the strike as a whole if not American unionism. Though no one knows who sent the first shots in the battle, which killed seven workers, entering the fight was critical to the events of the strike. Before the invading Pinkertons arrived on behalf of the corporation the striking, workers had two options of attack in their struggle. They could have proceeded violently or nonviolently, but it was necessary for their success that they were complete in their decision; something the workers failed to do.
When the workers returned shot the Pinkertons fired, they were consumed with a violent conflict. Success for the workers at this point in the melee with the corporation would have been a takeover of the works. After the Pinkertons were forced into retreat, the workers should have established the works as belonging to them, no longer the property of the company that they were embattled with. The workers should have attempted to restart production and function as though the corporation was not necessary. Then, when the government was pressured to assist the management the workers would have better leverage, proving to an extent the necessity of the labor contrasted with the frivolity of the management.
Had the workers resisted in a different way the outcome may have been greatly different. Sitting on the fence, the workers chose a campaign of mild violence. I have already explained how a campaign based on extreme violence could have been more effective; a campaign of non-violence could have been equally effective. If the workers organized a strategy of nonviolent confrontation with the Pinkertons who were quickly coming up the Monongahela River, the initial confrontation would have been initially more damaging to the workers, but if they were still able to prevent infiltration of the plant, things would have been dramatically different. Public support would have fallen much more greatly on the poor workers who were brutalized by the evil forces of capitalism. Furthermore, the possibility of the state government sending in National Guard would have been greatly reduced. If subduing riots, which were stated as the primary objective of the National Guard, were not imminent, then government support of the management would have been altered greatly. Judicial support and absurd evictions still would have strengthed the company, but without the National Guard, events may have been altered greatly. Simply a sit-down strike, as autoworkers succeeded with years later, could have produced vast results for workers that chose instead to shoot it out with Pinkertons and stop the violence there. Carnegie fought valiantly long before the strike of 1892 to win the support of his workers and America as a whole. Constantly publishing papers on his philosophies of worker rights and equalities (rarely practicing them), he gained a reputation of being a supporter of labor. People believed that his thoughts were genuine and from them would spring a fruitful relationship between the workers and management. For the people that were not employed by Mr. Carnegie, advantages still poured out from his philanthropic heart. Construction of libraries began in 1889. It soon became a fact in towns run by Carnegie and his steel, if you want it, ask the corporation, and it will come true. This sort of paternalism damned the men who went on strike. How unreasonable were these men that did not see the advantages of simply working for a man as wonderful as Mr. Carnegie. It was a difficult fight for the workers in the public market. He gave them so much, how could they demand more thought the world. Beyond the boost in public opinion that Carnegie's welfare capitalism provided the company, a paternalistic grasp on his workers provided an edge, which helped him defeat labor over and over again. During the 1892 strike, an already established history of paternalistic giving granted Frick and Carnegie a great advantage. Like in many towns founded on individual industrial production of the time, much of Homestead was company owned, including company housing. This provided the damning advantage for management. While searching for weaknesses in the strikers, this appeared front and center. Evictions started quickly. Forced from their homes based on political beliefs and the courage to stand up against the steel industry, many of the strikers were weakened. These ejections struck a dramatic blow to the forces of labor. The implications of a workforce dependent on the generosity of its employers were felt strongly during the strikes, and long after them. Not only did it make it difficult for labors fight in the public sphere, in their own living conditions, but also with dissention within the ranks. The community would lose so much if the money from the corporation ceased. Not just the workers, but the whole town had to be careful when dealing with the corporation for fears similar to a child fearing her parents would take away her allowance. Furthermore, when the towns were decimated after the corporation left, worst of all Homestead, there was no one to turn to, the paternalism that provided so much, the taxes that fed so much, all lost because of dependence. Ultimately the greatest point of leverage for management was the incestuous relationship it had with government on all levels; local, state, federal. For the insurrection of 1892, when means the company took that was outside the scope of convention (Pinkertons) failed, state government was quickly called in to assist. Militia arrived and they foreshadowed the oncoming demise of the strike. Once armed militia, empowered by the state of Pennsylvania, took guard of the works, scabs and strikebreakers could be brought in easily. Soon after the executive branch of power displayed its allegiance to management, the management utilized the judicial branch of government as well. Ludicrous charges were handed to organizers of the strike, ranging from murder to treason. The state demonstrated with use of militia forces and preposterous criminal charges that it was the intention of Pennsylvania to maintain the status quo between labor and management. However, government infiltration spread outside of the state level. Sheriff McCleary worked hard in Homestead to use only local power to protect the industry against the worker. It was only after weeks of recruiting deputies that turned up none that McCleary admitted the power had to be turned to a greater force, that was when Governor Pattison was able to step in with national guard. It was in 1919 that state authority was no longer powerful enough to suppress workers. The corporation enrolled the same plan it used against workers in the 1892 strike, when it could not suppress with local forces and the deputized forces behind Sheriff Haddock, it moved to state forces. As a replacement for Pinkertons, Pennsylvania created the Coal and Iron Police to repress labor activities. Furthermore, tactics of falsely imprisoning organizers to force them to pay fines was institute again from the 1892 strike. When none of these methods seemed to work it were federal troops that were ushered in, first to Gary. It was not only brute force used by the federal government to quell resisting labor, but also conferences and committees organized the President to persuade a more peaceful solution. Conferences were called hoping to postpone strikes. When strikes continued in the time leading to these conferences, the conferences were used by management to discredit labor and reject all concessions. Government consistently assisted management in their attempts to quell movements of economic democracy by unions. The implications of government's effect on the relationship of labor and capital is broad and fails to show its true significance long after the strikes of 1892 and 1919. New Deal legislation was proposed as support to America's labor force in its darkest hours. Through its laws, government acceptance of unions and collective bargaining was finally fact. Nevertheless, it would be absurd to look at laws created in the 1930s in the vacuum of their era. If you were to ignore industrial reasons for the onslaught of the depression including overproduction and over-payment as mistakes and mis-regulation of management, you would still be able to look at the effects of government intervention from the strikes that decimated Homestead years before. Firstly, based on the calamities brought upon Homestead by the strikes themselves, both worker and citizen, the labor of steel industry was not enthused by union organizing when it was finally condoned. Furthermore a precedent was set in the steel towns all across the Valley, labor could not succeed. Frick put pressure on them outside of government authority, and if necessary government authority could be bypassed again. As soon as the law passed, corporation officials were theorizing ways that the industry could avoid independent unions, including company-run collective bargaining agencies. Finally, there was nothing for the steel workers to join. Though Amalgamated was conservative and elitist, its progression was hampered greatly by the effects of the strike of 1892. Were it not for the crushing blow against the union in that strike, the possibilities of Amalgamated would be endless. No doubt, a serious possibility was the maintenance of a conservative, elitist organization that seemed to inevitably side with capital before the workers, however an organization could have sprung from a successful strike that saw opportunities for the advancement of unskilled workers and skilled workers alike. Amalgamated could have been a formidable entity were the government not called in for its destruction. When the American Federation of Labor (AFL) stepped into the organizing of iron and steel workers in 1918, its organization mirrored the conservatism of Amalgamated 27 years before. Samuel Gompers pled with Woodrow Wilson at the time not for support but merely for moderation. Rooted in Wilson's ineptitude and disdain for strikes, very little government support was thrust toward labor before the strike. Again, the failure of the strike decimated the AFL's attempts to organize labor. Though the AFL remained formidable as a collective bargaining agent for years, the loss at Homestead and other steel towns secured its place as an organization that failed to help workers in times of true crisis, as it remained until its merger with the Congress of Industrial Workers (CIO), which was able to seize the opportunity presented in the New Deal and create and active union for steel workers (though it quickly followed the road of its predecessors). Again, perhaps a successful strike would have alter the thinking of Gompers and others in the AFL to make it a more dominant force for the working class. |
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